Drawing on the works of Ludwig Wittgenstein as well as (neo)pragmatism, this project explores the practical dimension of solidarity as one of the EU’s core values. More concretely, it will be scrutinised how and to which extent the recurring use of the concept of solidarity is mirrored by a corresponding practice in the EU. By arguing that even though there is a link between the concept and the corresponding actions that define the meaning of solidarity, the density of this link cannot be measured by relying on either the textual or the practical side. Rather, both have to come together to fill solidarity as a concept and value with life and give it a central role in the integration process.

In this prospect, the European Union (EU), as one of the biggest common markets worldwide and a significant actor in international relations, will have the chance to be a major partner in this project of connecting East and West more closely. Even more, to implement the ambitious initiative will hardly work without the EU’s willingness to engage in the project and in a mutual partnership.
The research project examines four major elements that are crucial in this context: First, the development of the legal and political – not just economic and financial – framework that allows for more than preferential trade arrangements. Second, the political readiness of the EU and China to establish common institutions within the BRI framework and work together in the institutions on equal terms. Third, the joint clarification of the “rules of the game” that will guide the political and economic exchange. Fourth, the development of a stable investment basis and a supervision mechanism that will make the initiative work in practice. Putting special emphasis on the EU side, it will be studied how each of these four elements will be crucial for the future development of the BRI.

First, RICTs are treated as “like units”, i.e., even though there is a multitude of different courts and tribunals, all having their own specific ways of problem resolution, political science has not yet developed theoretical tools to account for these differences. Second, law is treated as a “black box” in that the law itself, as an independent institution providing reason for action and imposing certain law-specific demands for reasoning and action, is barely considered significant. Third, the influence of extra-legal contexts and different degrees to which RICTs are embedded in adjacent functional contexts—like certain political, economic, or societal ones—is largely neglected.

This project aims to show that these gaps in current research can be closed by applying and further developing a novel contextualist approach. The basic claim of this approach is that it is essential to consider the context in which action takes place, and that reasoning and action can only adequately be understood relative to a specific context. As an empirical contribution and in order to prove the heuristic value of a contextualist approach, four different groups of RICTs will be examined here in a number of explorative case studies: a) standing regional courts in Europe, b) standing regional courts in other world regions, c) standing international and sectorial courts, d) ad-hoc arbitration and quasi-judicial bodies. The four sets of case studies will be carried out by using a method of double triangulation (contextual and empirical triangulation), and by conducting and analyzing elite-interviews with the representatives of judicial institutions.

The objective of the project is a theoretically as well as empirically grounded contribution that aims at three major outcomes: making different courts, tribunals, and quasi-judicial bodies understandable and comparable by making them theoretically differentiable; analyzing the ways in which legal contexts are interconnected, how these adapt to political, societal and economical processes they are confronted with, and how this shapes the reasoning and action of different RICTs; approaching the pressing and critically debated questions about the legitimacy and democratic foundations of RICTs in the making of a global legal order (e.g., in case of the much-debated international investment arbitration) from a differentiated and comprehensive theoretical perspective.

When it comes to analytical questions regarding the prominent and trail-blazing role of the European Court, there also seems to be consensus that “integration through law” can be analyzed and explained adequately by adopting the theoretical patterns originally invented by political science to describe integration processes induced by politically motivated actors, like the Commission, the Member States, or transnational elites and interest groups. Consequently, EU law is no longer perceived as mere texts negotiated by various political actors and written down in the Treaties. European law is understood to constitute a new political arena where, in addition to a variety of rational actors – from private national litigants, to diverse pro-integration activists, to nation states, to the genuine European institutions – the Court is trying to exert its influence and implement its interests by using rational strategies of enforcement. This research proposes that the assumption of rational actors in the field of law is not false per se, but that the model of rationality as the core of actor-centered integration theory has to be rethought to derive more appropriate and convincing explanations. The basic claim is that there is not just one kind of rationality, but a multitude of rationalities that are dependent on certain social contexts. European law constitutes such a context, and should be perceived as a self-contained and independent sphere of action and thought that self-generates impetus for integration. Therefore, integration through law may only be adequately understood from the inside by examining the idiosyncrasies and rules of the law – i.e., the rationality of the law.

Here an alternative approach to studying the ECJ and integration through law based on a contextual understanding of rationality called “context analysis” is proposed and applied, which supplements current research and highlight the options and limitations of reasonable action within the context of European law. Influenced by Max Weber’s “Interpretative Sociology,” and especially by Ludwig Wittgenstein’s works on the philosophy of language, this contextual approach does not follow a dispositivist or cognitivist understanding of rationality. Rather, rationality is defined here, based on Wittgenstein’s later work, as the sum of language-practical rules in a specific context. From this perspective, what characterizes the EU today is that it is not only a multi-level governance system, but also a multi-context system. The making of Europe does not just take place on different levels within the European political framework, executed and fostered by different groups of actors or institutions. Rather, it also happens in different and distinguishable social contexts – distinct functional, historical, and local frameworks of reasoning and action – that political science alone cannot sufficiently analyze with conventional and generalizing models of explanation.

Following this line of argument this project seeked to undertake a close context analysis of the Courts’ legal practice after the “constitutional compromise” in a number of currently discussed landmark cases, like Viking, Laval, Rüffert (2007/08, on fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights), Kadi and Al Barakaat (2008, on the autonomy of the European legal order vis-à-vis international law), Kücükdeveci and Test Achats (2010/11, on non-discrimination) Zhu and Chen and Rottman/Bayern (2004/2010, on European citizenship), or the recently decided case Brüstle/Greenpeace (fall 2011, on fundamental rights and patent law). These can be seen as building blocks in the expansion of European law, and should therefore be highly relevant to the further development of the community’s legal order after the “constitutional compromise.” The premise of a contextual approach towards these contemporary jurisprudential developments is to first draw a convincing picture of the ECJ’s role in this process, and second, to shed light on the ongoing constitutionalization that will be of great importance to the progress of integration in the coming years. For this purpose, these legal are contextualized and systematically examined in their historical, functional, and local aspects.